1. Responsible and inalienable rights; 2. human rights and special rights; 3. Negative rights or freedoms and positive rights; 4. Absolute and prima facie rights. The question of the moral limits of animal testing is of particular importance to science. Some scientists burn and maim animals to develop treatments for people who have been burned and maimed. Since anesthesia and painkillers would interfere with some of these experiments, the animals receive nothing for their pain. Just because these acts are called experiences does not mean they should not be considered acts of cruelty. We must therefore ask ourselves whether we should regard these acts as cruel; whether the cruelty constitutes a violation of moral rules or obligations towards animals; and whether the violation can be justified. In short, moral rights are those that are recognized as morally correct or acceptable for the common good of humanity. Therefore, they are not formulated by any state or authority of a country, and they do not vary from country to country and person to person. The next characteristic of moral rights concerns their equality.
Moral rights are the same for all who have them, which is why no human being can be denied rights on arbitrary, prejudicial or morally irrelevant grounds. Race is one of those reasons; Determining which people have rights based on race involves a particularly virulent form of prejudice. What race we are tells us nothing about the rights we have. Does this mean that it must always be wrong to take someone`s life, hurt them or restrict their freedom? No. When people overstep their rights by violating ours, we act within our rights when we respond in a way that may interfere with or restrict the freedom of violators. Suppose a thief attacks you. So you are certainly acting within your rights if you use sufficient physical force to defend yourself, even if it harms your abuser. Sometimes those whose rights are violated do not understand the injustice done to them. What sometimes happens to children and people with severe developmental disabilities, regardless of age, are obvious examples of how this can happen. Because of their vulnerability, these people are easy prey for those seeking benefits, whether personal or public. When they are used as a means to such ends, not only are the rights of these persons violated; Moreover, those of us who understand the wrongs that have been committed have a duty to intervene on behalf of the victims, to stand up and stand up for them. Moreover, duty here is itself a demand for justice, not a call to generosity.
We owe our help to these victims; Help is something they deserve, not something we would be terribly kind to provide. The less people are able to defend their rights, the more we have a duty to do so for them. Instrumental legal theories claim that moral rights are instruments or means of promoting valid goals or outcomes (e.g., welfare or equality) or recognizing the moral status of individuals. Such theories attribute a derivative status to rights and respect for rights, either as a means of an end or as a means of recognizing legal personality or aspects thereof. Nevertheless, they can give practical priority to rights and their respect. That is, they can claim that rights for practical purposes (consideration, justification, etc.) function as if they were restrictions. Since the rigor with which the term “rights” is used does not clarify questions concerning the obligations of moral actors towards beings who are not moral actors, more needs to be said. The four rights that were considered fundamental human rights in the late eighteenth century—the right to life, liberty, the “pursuit of happiness,” and property—were considered freedoms, not positive rights. Other people were generally considered morally forbidden to interfere with the pursuit of another`s life, the exercise of liberty, the pursuit of happiness, or the preservation of property.
They had no moral obligation to save other people`s lives, secure their freedom, promote their happiness, or provide them with goods. In a pluralistic society with many different subcultures, people are more likely to agree on what each person is entitled to than what each person owes to others. For example, suppose that in one culture, some child-rearing tasks are duties of the father, and in another similar culture, duties of the mother or maternal uncle. Members of different cultures may disagree about the moral duties of maternal fathers, mothers, and uncles, but they may still agree that a child should receive such care. Another difference between human rights and moral rights is their formulation and origin. Human rights and moral rights are universal and timeless, and they are not formulated by laws or statutes, but documented by people for specific statutes and constitutions, while legal rights are not universal. Legal rights vary from nation to nation and person to person, and they are drafted and formulated by the legislative body of the states/countries. A more modern version of this theory was proposed by MacCormick (1977), who argued that a rights holder was the intended beneficiary of a particular benefit and was not simply a general beneficiary of the rules. However, even with this change, it remains difficult to explain the rights of third parties under contracts.
Suppose that X and Y enter into a contract imposing customs duties on each of them, with the intention that the performance of those obligations will benefit Z. According to the theory, Z must (conceptually) be a legitimate rights holder. But it is indeed a completely random question of whether Z is or not. Some legal systems recognize Z rights in such a situation, others do not. In the United Kingdom, for example, Scots law recognized these rights for a long time under certain conditions, but English law did not do so until the situation was changed by law in 1999. There is another important distinction between the types of rights that goes beyond the other distinctions discussed so far. On the one hand, some rights only require that others do not disturb or restrict the rights holder. These are called negative rights or freedoms. On the other hand, there are positive rights, that is, the right to receive something. In order to respect another person`s negative right, you simply do not have to interfere with the exercise of the right in question and not give them special opportunities to exercise that right.
Examples of these negative rights are a person`s right to freedom of expression and religious expression. In the case of positive rights, it is not sufficient to leave the right holder alone; Something has to be done for them. As a rule, certain goods or services must be delivered. It is often assumed that moral obligations and moral rules apply to the treatment of human corpses and nonhuman animals. Taking these claims into account illustrates how moral obligations and moral rules can be recognized in the absence of corresponding rights. Consider the treatment of human corpses. Some religions believe that the treatment of corpses is about the person whose body it was, but most people recognize the moral rule that they must treat human corpses with respect, even if they subscribe to such a belief. (The behavior considered respectful depends on the culture. For example, autopsies are considered disrespectful in some cultures.) There are a variety of reasons to believe that people should treat corpses with respect. A very common one is that if we don`t treat human corpses with respect, we risk becoming insensitive to living people.
Another, more common in ancient times, is that a person can be confused with dead. As a rule, the remedies themselves include other remedies, such as the imposition of a court decision, possibly under penalty of a criminal or quasi-criminal sanction, or the freezing or confiscation of a person`s property if, for example, someone has not paid damages previously awarded by the court. The details of these additional remedies vary from system to system. This is a different question from whether the criminal law can act to recognize and protect moral rights. It seems possible to claim this, since moral rights can be protected not only by legal rights, but also by legal obligations towards others (without corresponding legal rights). For example, a legal system could create a criminal offence of harassment to protect a moral right to privacy without necessarily recognizing a legal right to privacy, that is, something that would serve as a positive reason for privacy in the interpretation of ambiguous rules or in the development of the law.